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Normally, any property or services provided by an employer to
an employee constitute gross income to the employee for federal
income tax purposes.' Compensation may be paid in many forms
other than cash. An employer's provision of meals and lodging to
an employee should generally constitute income to the employee.
Nevertheless, in some situations it would be unfair to tax an em-
ployee on the value of meals and lodging received. These situations
arise out of an employer's business necessity and occur when an
employee must accept the meals or lodging. Congress, the Treasury
Department, and the courts have long recognized the desirability
of excluding from an employee's gross income the value of meals
and lodging provided in these situations.
Congress provided for exclusion of employer-provided meals
and lodging in Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter I.R.C.] section
119. For the value of meals to be excludable, the employer must
provide them on the business premises for his convenience. Lodg-
ing is excludable only when a third requirement is met: the em-
ployee must be required to accept the lodging as a condition of his
employment.
Even before Congress enacted section 119, however, the Trea-
sury Department and courts had ruled that the value of meals and
lodging was excludable in some instances. In many respects, sec-
tion 119 is a response to these rulings. Congress intended to adopt
some aspects of the judicial and administrative rulings, and also to
change others. Since the enactment of section 119, however, courts
have tended to apply section 119 by resorting to pre-section 119
concepts. Some courts have strained to apply section 119 to partic-
ular fact situations when it seemed fair to do so. At other times
taxpayers have successfully used section 119, complying with its
technical wording in situations where Congress may not have in-
tended for section 119 to apply.
Even though section 119 has only limited application and may
be somewhat confusing, it is useful in a variety of situations. By
understanding the statutory requirements and how the Internal
Revenue Service [hereinafter I.R.S.] and courts apply them, tax-
1. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(1), 83(a) (1982).
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payers can take advantage of this provision. This comment ad-
dresses the technical requirements of section 119 and its applica-
tion in certain employment settings. First, the comment analyzes
the convenience of the employer doctrine, the requirement that
meals and lodging be provided on the business premises, and the
requirement that an employee be required to accept lodging for it
to be excludable. Next, it discusses application of section 119 to
shareholder-employees and partners. Finally, the comment ad-
dresses how employers may advantageously use section 119 even
when they charge employees for meals or lodging.
II. "CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER" SHOULD BE EQUATED WITH
BUSINESS NECESSITY
To exclude the value of meals or lodging from gross income
under section 119, the employer must furnish them for his conve-
nience.2 The treasury regulations define convenience of the em-
ployer as "a substantial noncompensatory business reason of the
employer." 3 The fact that meals or lodging provided to an em-
ployee may compensate him does not negate the exclusion if they




The present convenience of the employer doctrine originated
in early administrative and judicial decisions. In its earliest rulings,
the Treasury Department stated a rule similar to that of section
119:
When living quarters such as camps are furnished to employees
for the convenience of the employer, the ratable value need not
be added to the cash compensation of the employee, but where a
person receives as compensation for services rendered a salary
and in addition thereto living quarters, the value to such person
of the quarters furnished constitutes income subject to tax.5
2. I.R.C. § 119(a) (1982).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2), T.D. 8006, 50 Fed. Reg. 2,964 (1964).
4. Id. This apparently includes the situation where an employer provides meals or
lodging solely for a noncompensatory business reason but the meals in fact compensate the
employee, as well as the situation where the employer provides meals and lodging for com-
pensatory and noncompensatory reasons.
5. T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920), amending Article 33 of Regulations 45. See also O.D.
265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919).
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SECTION 119
While these rulings did not define "convenience of the employer,"
two subsequent rulings explained that this required meals and
lodging to be provided as a matter of business necessity.
In 1950, however, the I.R.S. issued Mimeograph 6472,1 stating
that before determining whether meals or lodging could be in-
cluded in gross income, the I.R.S. should make a preliminary find-
ing based upon facts and circumstances before applying the conve-
nience of the employer rule.8 Thus, the I.R.S. contended that even
though meals or lodging were furnished for an employer's conve-
nience, other facts and circumstances might indicate the meals and
lodging were compensatory. In such cases, the other facts and cir-
cumstances controlled.9
2. Court Decisions
While the Treasury Department struggled with definition and
application of the convenience of the employer doctrine, courts
also attempted to apply the concept. In Benaglia v. Commis-
sioner,0 the employer, a hotel corporation, provided meals and
lodging at one of its hotels to Benaglia. Benaglia managed several
hotels for the company, and could not properly perform his duties
without eating and living at the hotel." The Board of Tax Appeals
recognized Benaglia had received something of value, although it
was merely incidental to performance of his duties.'" Because the
employer provided the meals and lodging at his convenience, the
court held the value was not income.' 3
In Van Rosen v. Commissioner, the Tax Court elaborated on
the Benaglia ruling.' 4 First, the court espoused a common sense
view of the convenience of the employer doctrine. An employer
likely regards the salary paid an employee to be for his own conve-
6. O.D. 814, 4 C.B. 84, 84-5 (1921); O.D. 915, 4 C.B. 85, 85-6 (1921).
7. 1950-1 C.B. 15.
8. Id.
9. Id. Mimeograph 6472 included an example: a state civil service employee was re-
quired to live at an institution so that he would be available for duty at all times. The value
of the lodging and meals was considered to be compensation under state statutes, civil ser-
vice rules and regulations, or the employment contract. Upon these facts, the I.R.S. con-
cluded that the value of meals and lodging was includible in the civil servant's gross income,
even though furnished for the convenience of the employer. Id. at 15-16.
10. 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
11. Id. at 839.
12. Id. at 840 (citing Tennant v. Smith, H.L. (1892) App. Cas. 150, III British Tax
Cases 158).
13. Id. at 840.
14. 17 T.C. 834 (1951). In Van Rosen the taxpayer claimed that cash allowances paid
to an employee for the convenience of the employer could be excluded from income. Id. at
836. The court held that no exclusion applied. Id. at 841.
1986]
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nience; if he did not, no employment would occur."5 The court did
not agree with that definition. Rather, the Van Rosen court, as did
the Board of Tax Appeals in Benaglia, held that satisfaction of the
convenience of the employer test occurred when the employer pro-
vided meals and lodging because the employee could not accom-
plish his duties without them.'
In 1953 the Tax Court held that an employee must include
meals and lodging in gross income if they compensate him, regard-
less of whether the employer provided them for his own conve-
nience. 17 While the court did not cite Mimeograph 6472,18 it fol-
lowed the same analysis. 9
3. Enactment of Section 119
Prior to enactment of section 119 in 1954, the convenience of
the employer concept was unclear. When the House of Representa-
tives considered section 119, it intended to change the law.2° The
House Ways and Means Committee Reports show that the House
initially intended to exclude employer-provided meals and lodging
from an employee's income if they were furnished on the em-
ployer's business premises as a condition of employment.2' The
House specifically declined to incorporate the troublesome conve-
nience of the employer concept. Even if meals or lodging were
compensatory, an exclusion would exist as if the provisions of the
proposed section 119 were met.22 The Senate Finance Committee
15. Van Rosen, 17 T.C. at 838.
16. Id. "[Tihough there was an element of gain to the employee, in that he received
subsistence and quarters which otherwise he would have had to supply for himself, he had
nothing he could take, appropriate, use and expend according to his own dictates, but
rather, the ends of the employer's business dominated and controlled, just as in the furnish-
ing of a place to work and in the supplying of the tools and machinery with which to work."
Id. The court appeared to refer to a lack of choice by the employee, also, although it did not
expressly so state.
17. Doran v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 374 (1953).
18. 1950-1 C.B. 52. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
19. See Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 89-90 (1977). The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955), disagreed with the Tax
Court's approach in Doran, and held that the convenience of the employer test was determi-
native regardless of whether meals and lodging provided by the employer might also tend to
compensate the employee. Id. at 268.
20. H.R. Rep., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4137, 4175.
21. Id. Note that the House requirement that meals and lodging must be furnished on
the employer's business premises as a condition of employment are identical to the second
and third requirements necessary to exclude the value of lodging currently under § 119. The
statute ultimately did not expressly require meals to be furnished as a condition of employ-
ment. I.R.C. § 119(a).
22. H.R. Rep., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
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added the convenience of the employer standard back into the bill,
however,2 and Congress ultimately enacted this version.24 To
demonstrate that the new statute changed prior law, the Senate
Report included an example with facts identical to those in Mime-
ograph 6472.25 Under the new law, meals furnished to a state civil-
service employee could be excluded from income. 26 Thus, the fact
that meals or lodging might also be compensatory no longer con-
trolled, if the requirements of section 119 were met.
B. Judicial Interpretations
Interpretation and application of the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine has been left primarily to the courts. Arguably, any
meals and lodging could be considered furnished for the em-
ployer's convenience, but, of course, such a result would contradict
Congress' intent.27 The Tax Court requires a "direct nexus be-
tween the lodging furnished and the asserted business interests of
the employer served thereby."28
This nexus may be demonstrated by contrasting two decisions
of the Tax Court. In Olkjer v. Commissioner,29 the taxpayer was
employed at a remote site in Greenland. The employer provided
meals and lodging for employees because no other facilities were
available. 30 The court stated that without the provision of meals
and lodging, it would be impossible to employ the taxpayer at all.31
Hence, a direct nexus existed. The Tax Court could not find a di-
rect nexus in McDonald v. Commissioner,32 however. In McDon-
ald, a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation provided an apart-
ment to a manager assigned to work in Tokyo, Japan. The
taxpayer argued that providing housing served Gulf's interests and
that, if Gulf had not provided housing, other accommodations
at 4175.
23. H.R. Rep., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4825.
24. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. -No. 83-591, § 119, 68A Stat. 39 (1954).
25. 1950-1 C.B. 15. See text accompanying notes 6-8, supra.
26. S. Rep., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE -CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4825.
27. See text accompanying footnotes 19-24.
28. McDonald v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 223, 230 (1976); Olkjer v. Commissioner, 32
T.C. 464, 468-69 (1959).
29. 32 T.C. at 464.
30. Id. at 466.
31. Id. at 468-69. The court even described the food and lodging provided by the em-
ployer in Olkjer as "more than a mere convenience of the employer." Id.
32. 66 T.C. at 223.
19861
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would have been unavailable.33 While the court did not dispute
that Gulf's interests might be served by providing housing, it
found that the employee's interests were primarily benefitted. In
contrast to the finding in Olkjer where no other facilities were
available to employees, the court in McDonald could find nothing
clearly indicating employer convenience.3 4
Courts realize that an employer's provision of meals and lodg-
ing will involve convenience to the employee as well as to the em-
ployer. However, the exclusion granted in section 119 applies only
when the employer provides the meals or lodging primarily for his
convenience. 5 This determination should be made on the basis of
all the facts and circumstances.36 In deciding whether meals and
lodging are in fact provided for the employer's convenience, courts
should determine whether a reasonable employer would provide
meals or lodging to employees rather than whether this particular
employer would do so. In other words, an objective test should be
used. 7
The convenience of the employer test is not the only condition
to be satisfied under section 119. The employer must have pro-
vided the meals and lodging on the business premises, and the
lodging must have been accepted as a condition of employment."
These factors are discussed below, but it is important to note that
definition of "convenience of the employer" depends at least in
part upon these two other requirements.
III. MEALS AND LODGING MUST BE PROVIDED ON THE EMPLOYER'S
BUSINESS PREMISES
A second important requirement must be met before the value
of meals and lodging may be excluded from gross income. The
meals and lodging must be provided by the employer on the busi-
ness premises.3 9 The regulations define "business premises of the
employer" to mean generally "the place of employment of the em-
ployee."' 0 This construction of the phrase has given rise to two
33. Id. at 229.
34. Id. at 230.
35. See, e.g., Nicath Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1260, 1265 (1966).
36. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 670 F.2d 167, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
37. Id. (quoting Dole v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 697, 706, aff'd per curiam, 351 F.2d
308 (1st Cir. 1965)).
38. I.R.C. § 119(a).
39. Id.
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c)(1), T.D. 6745, 29 Fed. Reg. 9380 (1964). Note that even
though § 119 speaks in terms of "business premises," nothing requires the employer to be
engaged in business as opposed to governmental, not-for-profit, or even personal endeavors.
[Vol. 47
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meanings: (1) a place where the employee performs a significant
portion of his duties, or (2) a place where the employer carries on a
significant portion of its business."' If the taxpayer can satisfy ei-
ther interpretation, then courts consider the meals or lodging to be
provided on the employer's business premises.
At first glance, defining "business premises" as the place
where the employer carries on a significant portion of its business
appears to be straightforward. In Lindeman v. Commissioner,"2 the
Tax Court possibly stretched this interpretation when it held that
a house located across the street from the employer's hotel but
next to a hotel parking lot constituted part of the business prem-
ises. The court explained in Lindeman that "on the business prem-
ises" means just that, not "nearby," "close to," or "contiguous
to.""' No doubt the tax court partially based its holding upon a
finding that the employee performed significant services at the
home.44 Hence, the home could have been considered an extension
of the premises.
One problem with the definition of "business premises" as a
place where the employer carries on a significant portion of its
business arises because section 119 may allow an employee to ex-
clude the value of meals or lodging provided at a location different
from that at which the employee performs services. In Dole v.
Commissioner,'45 the court stated that Congress probably did not
intend that result.4" But the I.R.S. has ruled that the meals of an
employee who normally works at one location but eats at another
of the employer's locations may be considered to be provided on
the employer's business premises.4'
If a taxpayer fails to make a strong showing that the employer
Id.
41. Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906
(1967); Dole, 43 T.C. 697. At least one court has characterized "business premises" three
ways. In Winchell v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 131 (D. Neb.), afl'd, 725 F.2d 689 (8th Cir.
1983), the court listed the two meanings given in Anderson and Dole, but included a third,
"living quarters that constitute an integral part of the business property," citing Bob Jones.
Id. at 136. A reading of Bob Jones discloses that the Claims Court was aware of only two
constructions of "business premises," however.
42. 60 T.C. 609 (1973).
43. Id. at 614.
44. Id. at 616. The court described how the employee used the house for some of his
office work, entertaining business guests, and observing part of the hotel.
45. 43 T.C. 697.
46. Id. at 707.
47. Rev. Rul. 71-411, 1971-2 C.B. 103, 104. Of course, the convenience-of-the-employer
and condition-of-employment (for lodging) requirements must still be met. In Rev. Rul. 71-
411, the employer served meals because either the employees needed to be able to answer
telephones at all times or they were limited to a short meal period.
1986]
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provides the meals or lodging at a location where the employer car-
ries on a significant portion of its business, courts will deny the
section 119 exclusion. In one case, a hotel manager received em-
ployer-provided lodging two short blocks away from the hotel. The
court held this employer had not provided lodging on the business
premises.48 The taxpayer who finds himself in this situation must
look to the other definition of business premises: a place where the
employee performs a significant portion of his duties.
The taxpayer in Adams v. United States espoused this the-
ory.49 The taxpayer, an executive of a Mobil Oil Corporation sub-
sidiary in Japan, proved he worked in his employer-provided house
at night and on weekends, held business meetings there, and enter-
tained business guests at the home.50 Importantly, the court be-
lieved the taxpayer's effectiveness as a corporate official would
have been impaired if the employer had not provided a large, well-
furnished home.5 1 The court explained that "on the business prem-
ises" includes lodging facilities where the employee performs sig-
nificant duties because the phrase "infers a functional rather than
a spatial unity. 5
2
A relationship exists between the business premises and con-
venience of the employer requirements. While an employer might
provide meals or lodging off the business premises for his own con-
venience, the requirement that the meals or lodging be provided
upon the premises tends to guarantee that they are provided for
the convenience of the employer. If a court cannot find meals or
lodging provided upon the employer's business premises, it proba-
bly will consider them to be provided neither for the employer's
convenience nor as a condition of employment. 53 Thus, there exists
a clear relationship between these requirements.
IV. LODGING MUST BE PROVIDED TO AN EMPLOYEE AS A
CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT
The third requirement applies only to lodging: lodging must
be provided by an employer to an employee as a condition of his
48. Anderson, 371 F.2d at 67. Likewise, the tax court has held that lodging provided
twelve miles from the job site was not on the employer's business premises. Crowe v. Com-
missioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 380 (1980).
49. 585 F.2d 1060 (Ct. Cl. 1978). See also United States Junior Chamber of Commerce
v. United States, 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
50. Adams, 585 F.2d at 1062.
51. Id. at 1066.
52. Id. See also Winchell, 564 F. Supp. at 136-37; Bob Jones Univ., 670 F.2d at 176.
53. See Bob Jones Univ., 670 F.2d 167; Winchell, 564 F. Supp. 131.
472 [Vol. 47
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employment.54 Originally, the House of Representatives had in-
tended for this requirement to apply to the provision of both meals
and lodging.6 5 When the Senate added "convenience of the em-
ployer" language to section 119, it deleted reference to providing
meals as a condition of employment.5 6
In defining the phrase, the Senate Finance Committee stated:
"'[R]equired as a condition of his employment' means required in
order for the employee to properly perform the duties of his em-
ployment. ' 57 The phrase clearly does not mean that the employer
must require the employee to be housed on business premises, but
only that circumstances necessitate this result.58
Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that courts uniformly
equate the condition of employment requirement with convenience
of the employer. The Court of Claims in United States Junior
Chamber of Commerce v. United States59 found that the Senate's
explanation of "required as a condition of his employment" was so
similar to the convenience of the employer definition given in
Mimeograph 50230 that Congress must have intended for no "sub-
stantial difference" to exist between the two."
Lodging usually should be considered provided as a condition
of employment when the employee has no choice but to accept it.
This requirement will be met when an employee must reside on
the business premises to accomplish his assigned tasks, 2 or when
other lodging is unavailable within a reasonable distance."3 In both
cases the employee would be "unable to properly perform [his]
duties. ' ' e4
As with the convenience of the employer doctrine, courts ap-
54. I.R.C. § 119(a)(2).
55. H.R. Rep., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 4175.
56. H.R. Rep., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 4825.
57. Id.
58. Setal v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 780, 782 (1961).
59. 334 F.2d 660, 663 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
60. 1940-1 C.B. 14. As a general rule, the test of "convenience of the employer" is
satisfied if living quarters or meals are furnished to an employee who is required to accept
such quarters and meals in order to perform properly his duties.
61. United States Junior Chamber of Commerce, 334 F.2d at 663.
62. See, e.g., Tress. Reg. § 1.119-1(d) ex. (5); Hatt v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M (CCH)
1194 (1969), afl'd, 457 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972); Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 27
T.C.M (CCH) 1351 (1968).
63. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(d) ex. (7); Setal, 20 T.C.M (CCH) at 782; Stone v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1021 (1959).
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ply an objective test to determine whether the employer provided
the lodging as a condition of employment.6 5 Thus, even an employ-
ment contract requiring the employee to live on the employer's
premises would not control. Because a rule based upon the pres-
ence or absence of such a provision could be easily manipulated,
the proper analysis considers all the facts and circumstances. The
existence of a contractual lodging requirement is just one of the
facts or circumstances to be taken into account. 6
V. USE OF SECTION 119
I.R.C. section 119 may be used by taxpayers in a variety of
situations; proper planning can expand application of the exclu-
sion. For example, section 119 may be used successfully by stock-
holder-employees and partners. Further, use of the section 119 ex-
clusion allows both employers and employees to avoid employment
taxes.
A. General Applicability
Section 119 applies to nearly any occupational setting. Thus,
restaurant employees,6 7 bank employees,68 construction workers,6 9
miners,70 hotel employees, 71 and agriculture employees 72 may qual-
ify to exclude the value of meals and lodging received. A taxpayer
simply must determine whether the employer provides meals and
lodging on his business premises for his own convenience, and
whether the employer provides lodging as a condition of employ-
ment. Some occupations enjoy a greater likelihood that section 119
will exclude the employer-provided meals and lodging.
B. Applicability of Section 119 to Shareholder-Employees
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the application of sec-
tion 119 to shareholder-employees of a corporation. A farm or
ranch corporation provides a good example. In Harrison v. Com-
missioner,3 taxpayers formed a corporation and transferred their
homes to it. A corporate resolution authorized payment for meals
65. Winchell, 564 F. Supp. at 135.
66. Setal, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 782-83.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(f) Ex. (1).
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(0 Ex. (3).
69. Tress. Reg. § 1.119-1(0 Ex. (7); Stone, 32 T.C. 1021.
70. Setal, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 780.
71. Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838.
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and lodging of its employees and required them to reside on the
premises to be available for emergency calls. 4 The employees were
also stockholders and officers in the corporation. The nature of the
corporation's operations required "constant supervision and availa-
bility of personnel. '75 Accordingly, the taxpayers met three section
119 requirements.70 One problem, however, centered on whether
the employees received meals, or simply groceries. Since section
119 provides an exclusion for meals but not groceries, the taxpay-
ers carefully demonstrated that meals had been provided. They
showed that some of the employees (who just happened to be
wives) had the duties of buying groceries, preparing meals, and
serving themselves, their husbands, and other employees.77 The
court held that meals had been served.
7 8
C. Application to Partners
Because section 119 specifies that the exclusion applies only to
meals provided to employees, partners in a partnership would ap-
parently not qualify. In some instances, however, the Code recog-
nizes that a partner does not always act as a partner, but rather in
some other capacity. When that situation exists, the Code charac-
terizes transactions between the partnership and the partner as if
the partnership relation does not exist.7 9 The taxpayer in Arm-
strong v. Phinneys° recognized this and applied it to the meals and
lodging he received as manager of a ranch. A partnership owned
the ranch, and the taxpayer-manager owned five percent of the
partnership.81 The court recognized that both aggregatess and en-
tity83 concepts may apply to a partnership, but that Congress ex-
plicitly recognized the entity theory when it enacted section
74. Id. at 1386.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1390-91.
77. Id. at 1386.
78. Id. at 1390. The corporation received a § 162 trade or business deduction for the
cost of the meals served. Id. at 1390-91. A similar case, involving a Montana ranch corpora-
tion, is McDowell v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 372 (1974).
79. I.R.C. § 707(a) (1982).
80. 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968).
81. Id. at 662.
82. Under the aggregate concept, "a partnership is simply an aggregation of individu-
als, each of whom should be treated as the owner of a direct undivided interest in partner-
ship assets and operations." W. McKee, W. Nelson & R. Whitmore, Federal Taxation of
Partnerships and Partners 1 1.02 (1977).
83. The entity concept views "a partnership [a]s a separate entity, apart from the
partners. Under this view, a partner has no direct interest in partnership assets or opera-
tions, only an interest in the partnership entity separate and apart from its assets and oper-
ations." W. McKee, W. Nelson & R. Whitmore, supra note 82, at 1 1.02.
1986] 475
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707(a).8 4 The court held that Congress had intended section 707(a)
to relate to section 119. It found no intent to the contrary.85 Hence,
a partner may be an "employee" for section 119 purposes, depend-
ing upon the particular facts of a case.
VI. EXCLUSION WHEN EMPLOYER CHARGES EMPLOYEE FOR MEALS
AND LODGING
When an employer provides meals and lodging in addition to
salary or wages, section 119 easily applies if the taxpayer meets all
the requirements. Many tax practitioners have found section 119
difficult to understand when an employer charges an employee for
meals and lodging.
Section 119 clearly provides for an exclusion when an em-
ployer charges for meals. The Code specifies first that "[in deter-
mining whether meals are furnished for the convenience of the em-
ployer, the fact that a charge is made for such meals ... shall not
be taken into account." 86 Further, when an employer imposes a
fixed charge for meals on a periodic basis, the amount of the fixed
charge should be excluded from the employee's income.8 7 Of
course, the meals must still be furnished on the business premises
and for the convenience of the employer. 88 Thus, "if an employee
has a choice of accepting the meals and paying for them or of not
paying for them and providing his meals in another manner," the
employer has not provided meals for his convenience, and section
119 does not apply.8 9 But if the employee must pay for the meals
regardless of whether he actually eats them, the exclusion may still
apply.90 Here the taxpayer must still show that a business neces-
sity exists for providing the meals. An employee who never eats the
employer-provided meals but pays the fixed periodic charge should
not be entitled to the exclusion.
Although the Code fails to discuss the effect of an employer-
imposed charge for lodging provided to an employee, the regula-
tions do. The regulations set forth rules nearly identical to those
discussed above for meals.9'
Thus, the Code and regulations clearly provide that a taxpayer
84. Armstrong, 394 F.2d at 661.
85. Id. at 663-64.
86. I.R.C. § 119(b)(2).
87. I.R.C. § 119(b)(3)(A).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(3)(ii).
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(3)(i).
90. I.R.C. § 119(b)(3)(B)(ii).
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b).
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who meets other requirements of section 119 may claim an exclu-
sion even though he must pay the employer for meals and lodging.
The employee should not be treated as receiving compensation
from the employer with a corresponding sale of meals and lodging
by the employer. One problem is that employers may account for
these transactions according to the cash that actually changes
hands. If the employer simply gives meals or lodging to an em-
ployee, the exclusion is "prerecorded." If no cash changes hands,
and no records are kept, neither employer nor employee will re-
member to report the value of meals and lodging as income. Hope-
fully, the employee will be entitled to the exclusion in that case.
If the employer does impose a charge for meals and lodging, he
should report the value of compensation after the exclusion to the
employee and to taxing authorities. Employers may believe they
have little incentive to do so, but they should remember that some
employment taxes are imposed upon the value of compensation af-
ter the exclusion.
Tax imposed under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act9 2
is the most significant such tax. The tax is imposed upon "wages"
as defined by Code section 3121(a). e3 Basically, "wages" includes
all remuneration, with some exceptions. This definition is analo-
gous to the definition of wages for federal income tax purposes.9 4
Although the definitions were similar, the Treasury Department
historically interpreted FICA wages to include the value of all em-
ployer-provided meals and lodging, e5 while it interpreted wages for
federal income tax withholding purposes not to include meals and
lodging provided pursuant to section 119.96 In 1981, however, the
Supreme Court held in Rowan Companies v. United States 7 that
the different interpretations could not be sustained in light of the
similarity in wording of the two statutes. Congress simply had not
intended such a difference in enacting the two statutes. 98 Accord-
ingly, the statute imposes FICA taxes upon wages after excluding
the value of meals and lodging. Likewise, federal unemployment
tax is also imposed after excluding these values." Apparently the
Montana Department of Labor and Industry does not allow an ex-
clusion for the value of meals and lodging for purposes of calculat-
92. I.R.C. § 3111 (1985) [hereinafter "FICA"].
93. I.R.C. § 3121(a) (1982).
94. I.R.C. § 3401(a) (1982).
95. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-1(e), (f) (1980).
96. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(9) (1980).
97. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
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ing state unemployment tax.100 Because the exclusions provided for
federal employment tax purposes can be significant, employers
have good reason to report an employee's compensation after ex-
cluding the value of meals and lodging.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 119 presents a useful and often necessary exclusion
from gross income. Because employer-provided meals and lodging
also constitute a benefit to employees, Congress, the Treasury De-
partment, and the courts have had difficulty providing a general
standard for application of the exclusion. The convenience of the
employer doctrine, the business premises requirement, and the
condition of employment requirement represent the best attempts
to apply what seems a simple idea: an exclusion should exist only
when an employer provides meals and lodging as a matter of busi-
ness necessity. Even with the confusion surrounding section 119,
taxpayers may still use it advantageously. Section 119 may be ap-
plied in the close corporation and partnership contexts. Even in
other situations, when the employer and employee do not have
similar interests, employment tax consequences can make the use
of section 119 beneficial to both parties.
100. Mont. Admin. Reg. § 24.11.808(1)(f) (1980).
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